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THE COMPARISON OF FOUR TYPES OF
EVERYDAY INTERDEPENDENCIES 
EXTERNALITIES IN EXCHANGE NETWORKS
Jacob Dijkstra and Marcel A.L.M. van Assen 
ABSTRACT
Actor behavior is compared theoretically and experimentally in four
well-known everyday interdependence situations; (i) the market, (ii) the
tragedy of the commons or resource dilemma, (iii) the public good prob-
lem, and (iv) the household. It is shown that the four situations can be
studied within one general framework of exchange networks with exter-
nalities. Core theory is generalized to exchange networks with external-
ities and applied to derive predictions concerning differences in behavior
in the four situations. The experiments corroborate the prediction that
competition is most fierce in the resource dilemma, fierce in the market,
and absent in the public good problem and household.
KEY WORDS • interdependence • exchange networks • externalities •
social dilemmas
The focus of the present study is the theoretical and experimental com-
parison of actor behavior in four well-known everyday interdependence
situations: (i) the market, (ii) the tragedy of the commons, also known
as the resource dilemma, (iii) the public good problem, and (iv) the
household. We model actor behavior in these situations as an exchange
of resources, and study these four interdependence situations in the
framework of a simple exchange network with externalities.
Exchange is typically thought of as the process through which indi-
viduals transmit and receive commodities. The significance of exchange
is not limited to economic contexts (e.g., Blau 1964; Homans 1958;
Lawler and Ford 1995; Molm 1997). Social interaction in general can
also be perceived as exchange since ‘much of what we need and value
in life (e.g., goods, services, companionship, approval, status, informa-
tion) can only be obtained from others. People depend on one another
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for such valued resources, and they provide them to one another through
the process of exchange’ (Molm 1997: 12).
An important branch of exchange research is devoted to investigation
of specific exchange situations, called exchange networks. The issue on
which this research mainly concentrates is the effect of networks on the
choice of exchange partners and the ratios of exchange (for example, see
the special issue on network exchange in Social Networks, volume 14,
and Willer 1999). In this line of research, an actor’s connections in a net-
work represent with whom the actor can exchange. If there is a connec-
tion between two actors in the network, these actors have the possibility
to exchange, but no obligation to do so. If there is no link between two
actors, an exchange between them is not possible. The central question
is then whether and how an actor’s profit or utility from exchange is
influenced by that actor’s position in the network.
Figure 1 contains the Line3 exchange network. The links in this net-
work indicate that actors A and C can each exchange with actor B, but
not with each other, whereas B can exchange with both A and C. In this
article we model the four interdependence situations mentioned earlier
by introducing externalities in exchange networks, using the one-
exchange rule. This rule implies that B can exchange with either A or C,
but not both.
Externalities of exchange are defined as direct (positive or negative)
consequences of exchanges, for the well-being of actors who are not
involved in the exchange. Externalities in the network of Figure 1 would
exist if after an exchange of two actors the profit of the third actor would
be affected as well. For example, if A and B exchanged with each other
and C experienced an increase in profit or utility as a direct consequence
of this exchange, then C would have experienced a (positive) externality
of the exchange between A and B. It is important to note that the fact that
C is possibly excluded from exchange when A and B exchange with each
other is not interpreted as an externality. The same holds for a possible
process of competition between A and C for access to B. Exclusion and
competition are merely two forms of interdependence that can be present
in an exchange network, regardless of whether externalities exist or not.1
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Figure 1. The Line3 network
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Although exchange networks have been studied extensively, the effect
of externalities on exchange in networks has been neglected in both the-
oretical and empirical research. The sole exception is research on col-
lective decision making (Stokman et al. 2001; Van Assen et al. 2003).
This research focuses on the fact that a bilateral exchange of two voting
positions changes the expected outcome of the vote, which directly
affects other political parties that are not involved in the exchange.
Many real-life exchanges, other than those found in collective decision
making, also have externalities for parties not involved in the exchange
(examples are given below). There is no reason to suppose that
exchanges with externalities are less common than exchanges without.
The neglect of studying effects of externalities on exchange in networks
is therefore quite remarkable.
An important cause of externalities of exchange lies in the fact that in
certain social situations actors share the possession of certain resources.
Exchanges of one of the actors that affect the stock of shared resources
then affect all actors that share these resources. To consider the general
case, assume a group of actors, of which a member engages in a bilat-
eral exchange of resources with an actor outside the group. Then exter-
nalities of exchange can create the four interdependence situations
studied in this article by systematically varying the resources group
members share (see Table 1).
If actors in the group share neither the resources they transfer nor the
resources they receive (upper left cell in Table 1), then the situation can
be characterized as a market. Consider, for instance, customers buying
their groceries in a supermarket; customers (group members) buying
their own groceries with their own money from the supermarket (an actor
from outside the group). If group members share only the resources they
transfer (upper right cell), the situation can be characterized as a resource
dilemma or tragedy of the commons problem, for example fishermen
(group members) sharing access to fishing waters but not the revenues of
selling the fish to others outside the group. The basic characteristic of
public good problems is that actors share the resources they receive but
not the ones they transfer (lower left cell), for example a person (group
member) buying beer for herself and her friends (fellow group members)
in a bar. Finally, in many exchanges of members of a household both
resources transferred and received are shared (lower right cell). For
example, the wife (group member) buys a sofa in a store (actor from out-
side the group) from the common family budget. Note that both sofa and
budget are owned by all family members. Therefore, this fourth interde-
pendence situation is called the household.
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It is important to remark that these four interdependence situations
are defined by the resources actors share, being the fundamental char-
acteristic distinguishing them. In some social dilemma research,
resource dilemmas and public good problems are presented as equiva-
lent with respect to payoff possibilities, and only different with respect
to the framing of the experimental task. For instance, resource dilemmas
and public good games are sometimes referred to as ‘take some’ (taking
from a common resource) and ‘give some’ (contributing to a public
good) games, respectively (e.g., Dawes 1980; Poppe and Zwikker 1996;
Rutte et al. 1987; Van Dijk and Wilke 2000). As will be shown later, the
interdependence situations in this article are not equivalent with respect
to payoffs, i.e., are not merely reframings of one and the same situation.
Note how sharing resources in the interdependence situations causes
externalities. Transmitting or receiving a shared resource directly affects
the utility of all actors in the group, regardless of which group member is
involved in the exchange. For example, consider the resource dilemma.
A transfer of resources (catching and selling fish) of one fisherman brings
about a loss to all fishermen (by increasing their marginal costs of catch-
ing fish, as additional fish are harder to catch, and ‘overfishing’ decreases
the rate of reproduction of fish) since these resources are shared by all
fishermen. However, since the received resources (the revenue of selling
the fish) are not shared, only the fisherman making the exchange profits.
We make three comments about our classification. Firstly, note that
we consider interdependence situations in which the behavior of group
members is affected by actors from outside the group. In classic exam-
ples of some of these situations, e.g., the ‘tragedy of the commons’ of
Hardin (1968), actors from outside the group are not present. In
Hardin’s example a group of herdsmen each tries to keep as many cattle
as possible on the common pasture. However, since our focus is on
an exchange between a group member and an actor outside the group,
the resource dilemma we studied is affected by the behavior of actors
118 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 20(1)
Table 1. A typology of four interdependence situations based on whether
resources transferred and received by actors in a group are shared or not
Sharing transferred resources
No Yes
Sharing received resources No Market Resource dilemma
Yes Public good Household
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outside the group that have an interest in the situation. Secondly, as was
observed previously, the interaction can be understood as the actual
transfer of physical goods but also as the performance of a behavior that
produces value for another. Thirdly, note that the classification is
exhaustive; all four possibilities of resource sharing are covered.
The focus of the present study is the theoretical and experimental
comparison of the interaction between group members and actors from
outside the group in the four interdependence situations: market,
resource dilemma, public good problem, and household. The interaction
is a bilateral transfer of resources, that is, it is conceived of as the
exchange of resources. Sharing resources between members of a group
induces externalities of exchange. Our research problem thus concerns
the effect of externalities or type of interdependence on the ratio of
resources exchanged.
The next section describes how the four interdependence situations are
modeled by the Line3 exchange network with the one-exchange rule, as
used in the experiments. The four experimental conditions only differ
with respect to the resources shared, as explained above. In the theory
section we formulate our theory and hypotheses. The theory is an adap-
tation of the core solution, a well-known theory in research on exchange
networks (e.g., Bienenstock and Bonacich 1992). The hypotheses con-
cern predictions of differences of exchange ratios in the four interde-
pendence situations. The subsequent section describes the experiments,
and is followed by the results section. A discussion concludes the article.
Sharing Resources and Externalities in
the Line3 Exchange Network
In by far the largest portion of the literature in the field of exchange net-
work research, exchange possibilities are represented as the opportunity
to divide a pool of valuable resources or ‘profit points’ (see, for instance,
Bienenstock and Bonacich 1992; Bonacich 1998, 1995; Bonacich and
Bienenstock 1995; Cook and Yamagishi 1992; Cook et al. 1983; Cook
and Emerson 1978; Heckathorn 1983; Karr 2000; Lovaglia et al. 1995;
Markovsky et al. 1993; Skvoretz and Burkett 1994; Skvoretz and Willer
1993; Thye et al. 1997; Willer and Skvoretz 1997). In the present article
we must deviate from this practice, however, since we investigate
the exchange of possibly shared resources. Therefore, instead of giving
subjects the opportunity to divide a fixed number of points, we endow
them with units of valuable resources that they can subsequently use
in exchange.
DIJKSTRA & VAN ASSEN: EXTERNALITIES IN EXCHANGE NETWORKS 119
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The endowments used in our experiment are presented in Table 2. The
first row of Table 2 indicates the three actors of the Line3 network.
The second row shows there are two goods, X and Y, in the network. The
third row depicts each actor’s initial possession or endowment (E) of
these goods. Thus, actors A and C each possess 1 unit of X and no units
of Y. Actor B holds no units of X and 48 units of Y. The final row of
Table 2 indicates the value or utility (U) of 1 unit of each of the goods
for the actors. Thus, for actors A and C a unit of X is 24 times more valu-
able than a unit of Y. For actor B, a unit of X is 48 times more valuable
than a unit of Y.
The endowments and utilities of Table 2 make profitable exchanges
feasible between A and B, and between B and C. In return for transfer-
ring her 1 unit of X to B, actor A wants to receive at least 24 units of Y,
whereas actor B is willing to transmit at most 48 units of Y. The same
holds for actor C. Thus, in both exchange relations profitable exchanges
are feasible in which A (C) transmits her unit of X to B and receives a
number of units of Y between 24 and 48 in return. For example, assume
A (C) gets 30 units of Y in return for her unit of X. The profit of actor
A (C) is then 30 – 24 = 6, whereas B earns 48 – 30 = 18. Note how the
sum of the profits of the two exchange partners in each exchange rela-
tion is 24. In Table 2, this is true for all possible exchange ratios. Also
note that we only consider profits earned in exchange, i.e., we do not
consider the value of the initial endowment. In the experiment reported
below, this was also the case; subjects were only paid for points gained
in exchange, not for the value of their initial endowment. An important
feature of the endowments and utilities in Table 2 is that any exchange
between A (C) and B is Pareto efficient: given any exchange ratio there
is no alternative exchange ratio that yields more utility for one of the
exchange partners, without decreasing the utility of the other. This is
true because A and C each have only 1 unit of X and thus must transfer
their entire endowment of X in any exchange.
120 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 20(1)
Table 2. Actors, goods, endowments (E) and utilities
(U) in the Line3 structure
Actors A B C
Goods X Y X Y X Y
E 1 0 0 48 1 0
U 24 1 48 1 24 1
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An additional implication of the utilities depicted in Table 2 is that
A and C cannot profitably exchange with each other. Thus, the network
structure of Figure 1 is endogenously determined by the utilities of
Table 2. An important restriction that we impose on the Line3 network,
both theoretically and experimentally, is that actors are assumed to be
able to complete only one exchange (this is commonly called the one-
exchange rule, e.g., Willer 1999). This implies that either A or C
exchanges with B, but not both.
The Line3 presented in Table 2 is employed in the experiments to
characterize the four interdependence situations as follows: A and C
share (i) no resources in the market, (ii) only resource X in the resource
dilemma, (iii) only resource Y in the public good problem, and (iv) both
resources in the household. Hence A and C constitute the group, B is the
actor from outside the group, X is the resource transferred, and Y is the
resource received by the group members. If A and C share X, they
receive payoffs from all units of X owned by both of them.
We now show how the resource dilemma and public good problem
originate from situations in which only one good is shared. Consider
first the resource dilemma. An exchange of A (C) with B means C (A)
incurs a loss since he loses X without receiving Y. Therefore, both A and
C have an incentive to outbid the other player by demanding fewer and
fewer units of Y. In fact, it is rational for A and C to accept a loss (up to
the size of the externality) in their exchange with B, to prevent receiv-
ing the externality. However, in doing this, A and C create a situation
that is Pareto inefficient: both players incur a loss, one through the
exchange with B and the other through the externality. This situation
could have been prevented, had A and C decided not to exchange with
B. However, given that A (C) doesn’t exchange with B, C (A) has an
incentive to complete an exchange with B. Both players have a ‘domi-
nant strategy’ (always underbid the other player), but in following this
strategy end up in a collectively inefficient situation (both A and C incur
a loss). This is the defining characteristic of the resource dilemma.
Now consider the situation in which only the good received is shared.
Both A and C have an incentive to let the other player exchange with B
and incur the cost of exchange, whereas they themselves profit more
from the exchange. This interdependence situation deviates from the
public good game most often studied in the literature, in the sense that
not exchanging with B is not a ‘dominant strategy’: if A (C) doesn’t
exchange with B, C (A) should, to gain at least some points. It thus
resembles a chicken game. However, the fundamental characteristic of
the public good game is that it ‘deals with situations in which goods and
DIJKSTRA & VAN ASSEN: EXTERNALITIES IN EXCHANGE NETWORKS 121
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services … are to be realized through individual contributions, whereas
consumption is not dependent on the individual contributions’ (Van Dijk
and Wilke 2000: 92), which is the case in our current public good game.
Theory and Hypotheses
Many theories of exchange in networks have been developed in the last
decades (e.g., for instance Bienenstock and Bonacich 1992; Braun and
Gautschi 2006; Burke 1997; Cook and Emerson 1978; Cook and
Yamagishi 1992; Friedkin 1992, 1995; Skvoretz and Fararo 1992; Willer
1999; Yamaguchi 1996). However, all these theories assume that exchange
is without externalities. Generalizing these theories to network exchange
with externalities is by no means straightforward. Dijkstra (2005) general-
ized one of these theories, core theory, to deal with externalities in
exchange networks. Core theory is a solution from cooperative game the-
ory originally introduced to the field of exchange networks by Bienenstock
and Bonacich (1992). The power of the theory is that it is simple, that is,
based upon a minimum number of assumptions. We will discuss both the
core solution and the generalized core solution in the light of the four inter-
dependence situations described in the previous section. Our hypotheses
are derived from the generalized core theory.
Original Core Theory and Generalized Core Theory
Original core theory requires that each possible coalition of players
(including 1-player ‘coalitions’) gets no lower payoff than the members
of that coalition can guarantee by cooperating among themselves. More
formally, let N be the set of players in the game. The characteristic value
function v assigns a total payoff v(S) to every subset S ⊂ Ν of players,
that they can realize among themselves, despite the actions of N \ S, i.e.,
the players not in S. Thus, v(S) represents the total payoff that a coali-
tion S can be sure to achieve. Using the characteristic value function,
one can define the core solution. Let x be a payoff vector, such that xi
represents the payoff for player i. A payoff vector x is in the core if it
meets the following three rationality requirements:
i) xi ≥ v ({i}) for every i ∈ N (individual rationality),
ii) Σ
i∈S
xi ≥ v (S) for every S ⊂ N (coalition rationality), and
iii) Σ
i∈N
xi = v (N) (group rationality).
122 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 20(1)
 at University of Groningen on November 12, 2009 http://rss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
With respect to exchange networks coalition formation is interpreted
as ‘agreeing to exchange’. For instance, in the Line3 market, the only
interdependence situation in this article without externalities, A and B
can guarantee a total payoff of 24 by exchanging with each another;
v(AB) = 24. Thus, a payoff vector can only be in the core if the sum of
the payoffs of A and B is at least 24. In the same vein, v(BC) = 24.
To find the core however, all logically possible coalitions must be con-
sidered. Therefore, also the 3-player coalition between A, B and C must
be taken into account. In the Line3 market this coalition can guarantee
itself a total of 24 points (v(ABC) = 24) by letting B exchange with
either A or C. However, in an exchange network such as we are investi-
gating here, coalitions of more than two players have no meaning: coalition
formation is intended to mean ‘agreeing to exchange’ and only connected
dyads can exchange. Regarding exchange networks without externali-
ties, however, Bonacich and Bienenstock (1995) have shown that if no
connected dyad receives less than it can guarantee by itself, this is also
true for all other coalitions. Thus, in exchange networks without exter-
nalities, coalitions other than connected dyads can safely be disregarded
when finding the core because these coalitions do not affect the core.
Therefore, the original core solution makes theoretically sensible pre-
dictions in exchange networks without externalities.
In the Line3 market the only payoff vector in which the sum of
payoffs of both the pair A-B and the pair B-C is 24, gives 0 to A and C
and 24 to B. In terms of the inequalities of core theory, (i) xA, xB, xC ≥ 0,
(ii) xA + xB ≥ 24, and xB + xC ≥ 24, and (iii) xA + xB + xC ≥ 24 are only
met if xA = xC = 0, and xB = 24. Thus, in the Line3 market the core pre-
dicts that B exchanges with either A or C and gives 24 units of Y in
return for 1 unit of X.
Unfortunately, in exchange networks with externalities coalitions
other than dyads cannot be disregarded when trying to find the original
core solution. Consider the Line3 household. The coalition between A
and B can guarantee itself 24, that is, again, v(AB) = 24. The fact that this
yields a positive externality for C is not included in the value of the coali-
tion between A and B: the core solution only considers what each coali-
tion can guarantee its own members. Also v(BC) = 24. However, the
all-player coalition can guarantee itself a maximum total payoff of
48 (v(ABC) = 48). This total payoff is achieved if B exchanges with either
A or C and transfers 48 units of Y in return for the 1 unit of X. The pay-
offs of both A and C are then 24, and the payoff of B is 0. Thus, the orig-
inal core solution in the Line3 household is the opposite of the core
solution in the Line3 market: all the surplus of exchange goes to A and C.
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Including externalities in exchange networks means the scope of core
theory has to be extended. Given this extended scope the proposition of
Bonacich and Bienenstock, that any payoff vector that gives each dyad
at least what its members can guarantee themselves is in the core, no
longer holds. For instance, consider an exchange between A and B in the
household, where B transfers 36 units of Y to A, in return for the 1 unit
of X. In this case all the actors get a payoff of 12, which means that the
sum of the payoffs in the pair A-B as well as in the pair B-C is 24.
However, the sum of all payoffs is 36, which is 12 short of what the
all-player coalition can guarantee.
To summarize our reasoning: as opposed to the case of exchange
without externalities, coalitions that cannot form (for instance, the all-
player coalition) affect the original core solution in the case of exchange
with externalities. Hence, the original core cannot be meaningfully
applied to exchange with externalities, but can be applied meaningfully
when externalities are not present.
Core theory can be generalized to deal with externalities simply by
dropping any requirements that pertain to coalitions larger than dyads or
coalitions of unconnected players. That is, coalition rationality is limited
to connected dyads and group rationality is dropped. One additional
assumption is required. This assumption is that if actors in a pair exchange,
they exchange in a Pareto-efficient manner, i.e., they cannot make an
exchange together that yields larger payoffs to both of them. Dijkstra
(2005) explains why this additional assumption is needed. Note that the
endowments in the Line3 network presented in Table 2 are chosen such
that exchanges are necessarily Pareto efficient. Hence, the assumption
concerning Pareto efficiency is not relevant in the present study since it
always holds in the experiment. The three assumptions of generalized
core theory can be described formally as:
i) xi ≥ v ({i}) for every i ∈ N (individual rationality),
ii) Σ
i∈S




yi ≥ w ({i, j}) for every connected i, j ∈ N (Pareto-efficiency of
exchanging dyads).
In i) through iii) above, x denotes the payoff vector with externalities, y
is the payoff vector without externalities, and w({i, j}) is the character-
istic value of pair {i, j}, disregarding externalities.
The generalized core requires that no individual actor or pair of con-
nected actors gets less than they can guarantee by themselves. Intuitively,
124 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 20(1)
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a payoff vector is in the generalized core when no connected dyad can
successfully object to it, in the sense that through exchange the objecting
actors can improve their payoffs. It is very important to note that in net-
works without externalities, the generalized core reduces to the original
core. Therefore, generalized core theory is a true generalization of core
theory to exchange situations that possibly include externalities.
Applying generalized core theory to the Line3 household we find that
any exchange between B and either A or C (in which both exchange
partners receive at least 0) is in the generalized core. This is true because
when one of the actors A and C exchanges, the other receives the same
payoff. The sum of payoffs of B and the exchanging actor is 24 by def-
inition. Then, the sum of the payoffs of B and the actor that doesn’t
exchange is also 24 by definition. In terms of the inequalities of the gen-
eralized core, (i) xA, xB, xC ≥ 0 and (ii) xA + xB ≥ 24 and xB + xC ≥ 24 are
met for any exchange, as long as no actor loses. Assume A exchanges
with B. Then xA + xB = yA + yB = 24, i.e., (iii) is met by definition. Since
xA = xC, we get xB + xC = 24. Mutatis mutandis the same holds when B
and C exchange.
Predictions and hypotheses concerning the exchange ratios
The application of generalized core theory yields extreme point predic-
tions in some interdependence situations. In these extreme predictions A
and C are predicted to transfer all or half of their resources to B.
However, these extreme predictions only occur after many rounds of
‘playing the game’ by the same subjects. For example, the Line3 market
has been studied in many experiments (see Van Assen 2003, for refer-
ences), and it has been found that the payoff of A and C systematically
decreases over rounds. Yet, it can take many rounds for their payoff to
approach the core theory’s predicted payoff. In our experiments the
number of rounds is limited. Moreover and importantly, we are mainly
interested in the relative comparison of behavior in the four interdepen-
dence situations. Therefore we do not focus on point predictions but for-
mulate all hypotheses in terms of comparisons of the average exchange
ratios of two interdependence situations.
In the previous subsection two predictions were already derived.
In the Line3 market without externalities both the generalized and
original core predict that B transfers 24 units of Y. In the Line3 house-
hold the generalized core predicts that B transfers a number of units
of Y from the interval [24, 48]. Hence, our first (statistical, alternative)
hypothesis is:
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Hypothesis 1: On average A and C receive more in the household than
in the market.
Now consider the Line3 public good problem. If A (C) makes the
exchange, C (A) profits, that is, externalities are solely positive. Therefore,
each exchanging pair can guarantee a total payoff of 24, and each actor
can guarantee himself at least 0. Thus, the generalized core requires that
(i) xA, xB, xC ≥ 0 and (ii) xA + xB ≥ 24, and xB + xC ≥ 24. Assume A
exchanges with B. Then xA + xB = yA + yB = 24, i.e., (iii) is met by defi-
nition. Since A and C share Y, but not X, we have xC = xA + 24, and xB +
xC ≥ 24 is also met by definition. Mutatis mutandis the same holds when
B and C exchange. Hence, the prediction of the generalized core for the
Line3 public good is identical to the one for the Line3 household: B
transfers a number of units of Y from the interval [24, 48].
Hypothesis 2: On average A and C receive the same in the household
and public good problem.
Finally, consider the Line3 resource dilemma. Again, each exchanging
pair can guarantee a payoff of 24. However, not all actors can guarantee
themselves 0 points, and this changes the generalized core solution. If A
(C) makes the exchange, C (A) obtains a negative payoff of –24, that is,
externalities are solely negative. For instance, assume B exchanges with
A and transfers 36 units of Y. Both A and B then earn 12, and C earns
–24. The sum of payoffs of B and C is 12 – 24 = –12, which is smaller
than 24. Therefore, this exchange ratio isn’t in the generalized core: the
pair B-C can successfully object to the payoff vector by exchanging. For
instance, an exchange between B and C in which B transfers 24 units of
Y yields B a payoff of 24 and C a payoff of 0. The sum of their payoffs
is now 24, and the new situation is an improvement for both B and C.
Given this new exchange ratio, however, A earns –24. Now the sum of
payoffs of A and B is 0, which is again short of 24. Therefore, the pair A
and B can raise a successful objection through an exchange in which B
transfers yet fewer units of Y. The generalized core requires that
(i) xA, xC ≥ −24 and xB ≥ 0, and (ii) xA + xB ≥ 24 and xB + xC ≥ 24. Assume
A exchanges with B. Then xA + xB = yA + yB = 24, i.e., (iii) is met by def-
inition, and xC = −24. Then, xB + xC ≥ 24 can only be met if xB = 48, imply-
ing xA = −24. Mutatis mutandis the same holds when B and C exchange.
Thus, the only exchange ratio that is in the generalized core is the one
where B transfers 0 units of Y in return for the 1 unit of X. In this case,
A and C both lose 24, no matter who exchanges, and B earns 48. Note
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that generalized core theory predicts that A and C are accepting losses
in their exchange with B, something actors are never predicted to do in
the case of exchanges without externalities; a principal assumption of
exchange (without externalities) between rational actors is that exchange
is mutually profitable. These considerations lead to Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3: On average A and C receive less in the tragedy of the
commons than in the market.
The hypotheses implicitly state that competition between group
members is different in the four interdependence situations. In resource
dilemmas competition is so fierce that group members are prepared to
hurt themselves (lose in exchange with B) in order to prevent being hurt
even more by someone else (incurring the externality). Competition is
also fierce in markets. In markets group members are willing to accept
a small gain in order to prevent obtaining nothing. In household and
public good problems less or even no competition is predicted.
Experiments
Subjects
Subjects were undergraduate students from different departments of the
University of South Carolina, at Columbia (SC). A total of 66 subjects
participated for pay. The average earnings were approximately 15 US
dollars for an experimental session that took at least 30 and at most 50
minutes.
Design and Procedure
Subjects participated in groups of three individuals. The number of
groups per condition was determined by an analysis of statistical power.
Two groups played the Line3 market, eight groups played the Line3
household, eight groups played the Line3 public good problem and four
groups played the Line3 tragedy of the commons. Each group of sub-
jects participated in one of the four games for 10 rounds of maximally
3 minutes each. Hence a total of 220 rounds were played in all.
Subjects entered the experiment room separately. They were ran-
domly assigned a network position (either A, B, or C), in which they
remained throughout the entire experiment. Subjects were seated in
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separate rooms where they could neither hear nor see any other subjects.
Subjects did not meet before or during the experiment. They usually did
meet after the experiment when the money was paid. However, subjects
didn’t know this in advance.
Upon being seated in their rooms, subjects received a written instruc-
tion explaining the experiment.2 Subjects typically needed less than 10
minutes to read the instructions. After finishing reading the instructions,
three practice rounds were played, using the Line3 market, i.e., the
structure without externalities. After completing the practice rounds, all
subjects received a written form that indicated how their monetary pay
depended on their points and, in the case of externalities, the points of
someone else in the game (see note 2). The experiment leader then gave
each subject a 10-item quiz to establish their understanding of the game
(see note 2). Subjects typically took no longer than three minutes to
complete the test. The experiment leader then checked the answers on
the quiz. A correct answer was worth 20 cents, so the entire quiz was
worth two US dollars. Very few subjects had any wrong answers. No
subject had more than one incorrect answer. In the case of a wrong
answer, the experiment leader asked the subject to rethink the answer
and explain it. All problems were then easily solved and all subjects
were paid the two dollars for the quiz. Subjects were informed of the
number of rounds to be played. The 10 experiment rounds then started.
Negotiations in the experiment were completed through computer ter-
minals, employing the ExNet 3 software developed by Willer and asso-
ciates at the University of South Carolina. Bargaining was unstructured
in the sense that the order and timing of the offers were up to the sub-
jects to decide. Subjects could make any number of offers they wished,
to any subjects they were connected with in the network, within a time
limit of three minutes per round. To carry out an exchange, an offer had
to be accepted and the acceptance confirmed by the actor initially
proposing the offer. A round ended after three minutes had elapsed or
when an exchange was completed.
Subjects were endowed with the goods and utilities corresponding to
their network position (see Table 2). The goods were abstractly labeled
X and Y, as in Table 2. After each round of play the resources were replen-
ished. Subjects were able to make one exchange per round only. The util-
ities from the final row of Table 2 were presented to the subjects as points
they could earn in the game. In the externality conditions (household,
public good problem, tragedy of the commons) subjects A and C were
informed privately of how their payoffs depended on exchanges of the
other player. Player B was ignorant of both the existence and the structure
128 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 20(1)
 at University of Groningen on November 12, 2009 http://rss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
of the externalities. Player B was kept ignorant to enable us to observe the
pure effects of externalities in a given structure, without the confounding
factor of another player (B) anticipating the externalities. Note that impos-
ing B’s ignorance makes the rotation of subjects across positions during
the experiment impossible.
Each subject earned a fixed amount of money per point. Money per
point differed per network position and per game and was private infor-
mation to the subjects, i.e., subjects didn’t know the pay rate of other
participants. Subjects only earned money for additional points they
scored through exchange or received as an externality of exchange. This
was implemented in the experiment by subtracting the value of the initial
resources from the points in each round. This way, subjects did not get
money for the resources they started out with, but only for profits made
in exchange and for externalities of exchange. The money per point was
chosen in such a fashion that the expected earnings of all subjects would
be 15 US dollars. Subjects that weren’t expected to earn any points, such
as A and C in the market, or that were expected to lose points, such as
A and C in the tragedy of the commons, earned a base rate irrespective
of their earnings in the game to compensate for this. This base rate was
private information. At the end of the experiments actors on average
gained approximately 15 US dollars, ranging from a minimum of
approximately 6 dollars to a maximum of approximately 25 dollars.
Results
Comparing All Four Interdependence Situations
In total 22 groups played one game for 10 rounds, yielding a theoretical
maximum of 220 exchanges. Of these 220 potential exchanges, 199
exchanges were actually completed. To account for the dependencies in
the data of the same group we estimated multilevel models to test the
hypotheses (e.g., Snijders and Bosker 1999), subsequently called
‘mixed models’. In all the mixed models reported below only the inter-
cept is random. All other effects are fixed.3
We first checked whether the exchange ratio was different for the four
interdependence situations. We estimated two mixed models with the
variable ‘group’ as the indicator for the second level, on all the games.
The dependent variable was the number of units of Y transferred by B
(Y) to either A or C. The analyses were conducted only on the 199
exchanges that actually occurred.
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Table 3. Comparing the four interdependence situations with respect to
exchange ratio – estimates for the null model (Model I) with one random
intercept, and the full model (Model II) with random intercepts and 
fixed effect of Round for each situation; dependent variable 
was the number of received resources (Y)
Model I Model II
coefficient coefficient
Intercept 31.56*** 25.13*** 
(1.76) (3.19)














−2 log-likelihood 1247.51 1175.53
Notes: Data shown are mixed model coefficients with standard error in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
The null model or Model I (see Table 3) that estimated an average
exchange ratio and a common effect of Round across all four conditions
yielded a fit or –2 log-likelihood (LL) equal to 1247.51 and an intraclass
correlation of 0.76. The intraclass correlation is a measure of the depen-
dency of the data in the same group, and can have a value in the inter-
val [0,1]. The value 0.76 signifies that the exchange ratio varied greatly
between groups. The average exchange ratio across all groups was 31.56
(S.E. = 1.76), and the effect of Round was significant and positive
(χ1
2 = 4.466, p = 0.03, two-tailed). The variable Round was computed by
centering the original rank numbers of the 10 rounds, i.e., Round = rank
number round – 4.5. The intercept of 31.57 can then be interpreted as
the average number of units of Y transferred by B in the ‘average’ round.
The full model or Model II estimated a random intercept and a fixed
effect of Round for each interdependence situation by including a
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dummy for three of the four situations. The Line3 market was taken
to be the reference game, the other games were labeled Household,
Public, and Resource. Model II was a huge improvement over Model I
(χ6
2 = 71.976, p < 0.001), indicating that the exchange ratio indeed dif-
fered across the four interdependence situations. The conditions also
differed with respect to the effect of Round. There was no effect of
Round in the market (F1, 176.99 = 0.02, p = 0.898) and in the household
(F1, 177.01 = 0.10, p = 0.749). In the public good problem the mean number
of Y transferred by B increased over rounds (F1, 177.07 = 8.56, p = 0.004).
In the resource dilemma the mean number of Y decreased over rounds
(F1, 176.99 = 6.03, p = 0.015). These trends are visualized in Figure 2,
which depicts the average exchange ratios in all four interdependence
situations as a function of Round. In later subsections it is verified
which of the situations were different from each other by discussing
separately the results corresponding to the four hypotheses.




























Figure 2. Means of Y transferred to B across rounds in Household,
Public good, Resource dilemma, and Market
 at University of Groningen on November 12, 2009 http://rss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Core theory does not allow one to derive hypotheses concerning the
time needed to reach agreement. However, since ExNet saved the time
needed to reach agreement, we also tested whether the four situations
were different with respect to the timing of the exchange. Timing was
measured in seconds. The results of the analyses are presented in Table
4. No difference in timing was observed across the four interdependence
situations (χ6
2 = 10.23, p = 0.12), and the effect of Round on timing was
never significant.
Comparing the Market to the Household
Hypothesis 1 states that on average A and C receive more in the
household than in the market. To test this hypothesis three mixed model
analyses were run, using only the data of the household and market
situations.4 In the market two groups played 10 rounds each. In 18 of
the 20 rounds agreement was reached. The mean Y was 25.11, with a
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Table 4. Comparing the four interdependence situations with respect
to time in seconds – estimates for the null model (Model I) with one
random intercept, and the full model (Model II) with random
intercepts and fixed effect of Round for each situation
Model I Model II
coefficient coefficient
Intercept 129.69*** 114.57 
(12.51) (37.26)














−2 log-likelihood 2196.01 2185.78
Notes: Data shown are mixed model coefficients with standard error in parentheses.
***p < 0.001 (two-tailed test).
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standard error of 0.58. Eight groups played the Line3 household. Of the
eighty rounds played, 74 ended in agreement. The mean Y was 35.05,
with a standard error of 5.28.
The intercept in the empty model was 33.08 (S.E. = 1.70, –2LL =
511.45). The intra-class correlation was 0.72. In Model I we added the
variable interdependence situation or ‘Game’ (household = 1, market = 0).
In Model II we added the variable Round. In Model III we added the
interaction Game*Round to test whether the effect of Round is different
across the two situations. See Table 5 for the results of the analyses.
On average A and C received 9.93 points more in the household than in
the market, corroborating Hypothesis 1 (χ1
2 = 7.91 p < 0.01, one-tailed).
The effect of Round in Model II was not significant (χ1
2 = 1.276, p > 0.10).
The effect of Game*Round was also not significant (χ1
2 = 0.161, p > 0.10).
Comparing Public Good to Household
Hypothesis 2 states that on average A and C receive the same in the
household and public good problem. To test this hypothesis again three
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Table 5. Comparing exchange ratios of household (Game = 1)
and market (Game = 0) – estimates for Model I with random intercept
plus fixed effect of Game, Model II also includes Round,
and Model III also includes Game*Round
Model I Model II Model III
coefficient coefficient coefficient
Intercept 25.14*** 25.13*** 25.13***
(2.56) (2.55) (2.55)
Game 9.93** 9.92** 9.91**
(2.86) (2.85) (2.85)




−2 log-likelihood 503.545 502.26 502.10
Notes: Data shown are mixed model coefficients with standard error in parentheses.
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
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mixed models were estimated (see Table 6), using only the data of the
household and public good situations. In 67 of 80 rounds of the public
good problem, agreement was reached, the average of Y transferred was
36.22, with a standard error of 7.49. The intercept in the empty model
or average exchange ratios across all exchanges was 35.67 (S.E. =
1.179, –2LL = 868.66), and the intra-class correlation was 0.48. The
effect of Game (household = 1, public good = 0) in Model I was not sig-
nificant, in agreement with our hypothesis (χ1
2 = 0.27, p > 0.10). The
effect of Round in Model II was significant (χ1
2 = 21.05, p < 0.01, two-
tailed), as well as the interaction in Model III (χ1
2 = 15.09, p < 0.01).
There is no effect of Round in the household, but a significant positive
effect of Round in the public good problems (F1, 59.14 = 33.45, < 0.001).
That is, in the course of the experiment A and C gained more points in
their exchange with B in the public good game. This effect can also be
observed in Figure 2. Additionally, we tested whether the two interde-
pendence situations differed in exchange ratios in only the first three and
the last three rounds. No significant difference was found in either case.
We also tested two hypotheses in which we compared each of the
household and public good problems to a bilateral exchange situation. It
can be argued that, with respect to incentives, the household condition
effectively reduces A and C to a single actor. If B were to exchange with
a single actor, the only outcome to be reasonably expected would be the
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Table 6. Comparing exchange ratios of household (Game = 1) and
public good problem (Game = 0) – estimates for Model I with random
intercept plus fixed effect of Game, Model II also includes Round, and
Model III also includes Game*Round
Model I Model II Model III
coefficient coefficient coefficient
Intercept 36.28*** 36.32*** 36.35*** 
(1.66) (1.64) (1.63)
Game −1.21 −1.33 −1.30 
(2.34) (2.32) (2.31)




−2 log-likelihood 868.40 847.349 832.26
Notes: Data shown are mixed model coefficients with standard error in parentheses.
*** p < 0.001 (two-tailed test).
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one in which both partners earned 12 points, i.e., an exchange in which
B transfers 36 units of Y in return for the unit of X.5 To test this we esti-
mated an empty mixed model to check whether the intercept was sig-
nificantly different from 36. In line with our expectation, it was not 
(F1, 7.90 = 0.427, p = 0.532). Also, for the public good problem we found
no significant deviation from 36 ( F1, 7.98 = 0.022, p = 0.886).
Comparing Market to Resource Dilemma
Hypothesis 3 states that on average A and C receive less in the tragedy
of the commons than in the market. To test this hypothesis again three
mixed models were estimated (see Table 7), using only the data of the
market and the resource dilemma situations. In the resource dilemma all
of the 40 possible exchanges were completed, the mean value of Y was
18.45, with a standard deviation of 7.55. Note that the mean value of Y
implies a mean loss for the exchanging A or C subject of 5.55 (24 –
18.45). The mean value of Y, however, differed markedly across the four
groups. In two of the groups on average the A and C subjects did not
lose or hardly lost on their individual exchanges with B, indicated by
average Y values of 22.5 (loss of 1.5) and 24.1 (gain of 0.1). In the other
two groups, the A and C subjects did concede losses, with average val-
ues of Y of 11.3 (loss of 12.7) and 15.9 (loss of 8.1).
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Table 7. Comparing exchange ratios of resource dilemma (Game = 1)
and market (Game = 0) – estimates for Model I with random intercept
plus fixed effect of Game, Model II also includes Round, and
Model III also includes Game*Round
Model I Model II Model III
coefficient coefficient coefficient
Intercept 25.13*** 25.17*** 25.13*** 
(3.00) (3.00) (3.00)
Game −6.68 −6.72 −6.68 
(3.67) (3.67) (3.66)




−2 log-likelihood 357.23 348.67 343.16
Notes: Data shown are mixed model coefficients with standard error in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).
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The average exchange ratio across all exchanges was 20.66 (S.E. =
2.147, –2LL = 359.881), and the intra-class correlation was 0.53. The
effect of Game (tragedy of the commons = 1, market = 0) was signifi-
cant (χ1
2 = 2.65, p = 0.05, one-tailed), corroborating Hypothesis 3.
The effect of Round in Model II was negative and significant (χ1
2 = 8.57,
p = 0.003). The interaction effect in Model III was also significant
(χ1
2 = 5.51, p = 0.02). The effect of Round was negative in the resource
dilemma (F1, 36 = 11.23, p = 0.002), and there was no effect of Round in
the market (F1, 65.99 = 1.15, p = 0.287). See Figure 2 for a visualization of
this trend.
Finally, it must be noted again that the observed differences between
groups in the resource dilemma were large. In the two groups in which
the A and C subjects lost in their exchanges with B, the average number
of units of Y transferred by B in the first round was 29. The actor
excluded from exchange then experienced the negative externality of 24.
In these groups the mean number of Y then sharply dropped in round
two, to a level of approximately 12, and stayed at this low level. In the
two groups in which the A and C actors didn’t lose or hardly lost in their
exchanges with B, the mean number of Y in the first round was 28 and
remained at this relatively high level during the remaining rounds,
regardless of the negative externalities experienced by the excluded
actor. Thus, the difference between these groups is caused by the differ-
ent reactions of the A and C subjects to the externalities experienced in
the first round. Moreover, regardless of whether the number of units of
Y dropped in the second round, it remained relatively stable in both
types of groups in the subsequent rounds of the experiment.
Comparing Proportions of Completed Exchanges
Core theory predicts that all exchanges are carried out. However, differ-
ent proportions of completed exchange were observed across conditions.
The observed proportions were 0.84, 0.90, 0.93, 1 for the public good
problem, market, household, resource dilemma, respectively. Multilevel
logistic regressions were carried out to test for differences in pairs.
Because the observed proportion was 1 in the resource dilemma, no
multilevel logistic regression could be carried out on all four situations
simultaneously, or on all pairs containing the resource dilemma.
Therefore, we chose the chi-square test for independence on pairs con-
taining the resource dilemma. This test assumes independence of obser-
vations, an assumption that is violated in the data. As a consequence of
the violation of this assumption the chi-square test is too liberal, that is,
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the reported p-values are too small. A safeguard is to take a smaller
significance level, e.g., 0.01 instead of 0.05.
The analyses demonstrated that the difference between the following
pairs of proportions of completed exchanges was at least marginally
significant (lower proportion mentioned first): public good and house-
hold, (Wald Z = –1.676, p = 0.10), public good and resource dilemma
(χ1
2 = 7.29, p = 0.007), market and resource dilemma (χ1
2 = 4.138,
p = 0.042), and household and resource dilemma (χ1
2 = 3.16, p = 0.04).
Discussion
In line with insights from social exchange theory the present article con-
ceived of interaction as the bilateral transfer of valuable resources, or
exchange. The research problem concerned the effect of externalities of
exchange, or type of interdependence situation. The interdependence sit-
uations studied in this article are well-known social situations that have
been frequently studied in the social sciences. The present article is the
first to distinguish between these situations based on the resources shared
by certain actors within the same framework of exchange networks with
externalities. We argue that this approach has several important advan-
tages. Our approach enabled us to systematically compare, both theoreti-
cally and empirically, different interdependence situations. We argue that
the possibility to analyze both behavior in different interdependence
situations and exchange behavior within one general system of goal-
directed behavior is of central importance to sociology. We believe that
the analysis of interdependence situations within the framework of
exchange networks with externalities is closer to many real-life interde-
pendence situations than the traditional analysis of these situations.
Traditionally, these interdependence situations are represented by games
(e.g., public good or, more generally, social dilemma) which make actors
focus on their actions and the consequences of their actions for themselves
and others. We believe that in real life the focus is more on the goal-
directed activity or exchange of the actor, and not on the consequences of
it for third parties; for example, fishermen who deplete their fishing waters
are probably more focused on trading with their fish than on the structure
of the resource dilemma. To conclude, we argue that the external validity
of our analysis may be larger than that of the traditional analysis.
An important additional implication of studying the effect of external-
ities through shared resources in exchange networks is that subjects in the
experiments have to be endowed with actual resources. Thus, the traditional
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design in which actors negotiate over the division of a fixed pool of points
is inappropriate. This is made most clear in the resource dilemma. In this
dilemma we predicted and observed that the basic principle of exchange
without externalities, ‘actors only exchange when exchanging leads to
mutually profitable outcomes’, does not hold; subjects A and C consent
to losses in their exchanges with B. Endowing subjects with resources
facilitates these losses, since subjects have the possibility to sell their
resources for a price so low they actually lose points. Dividing a fixed
pool of points does not allow the incurring of a loss.
In the present article we imposed on actors the restriction that they
could only exchange once every round. Given this one-exchange rule,
the four interdependence situations are exhaustive: in the market no
resources were shared, in the public good problem only resources
received were shared, in the resource dilemma only resources trans-
ferred were shared, and in the household both resources received and
resources transferred were shared. The examples of exchange with
externalities offered in the present article suggest that exchanges with
externalities are no less common than exchanges without externalities.
Despite the empirical abundance of this phenomenon, however, exter-
nalities in exchange networks have hardly been investigated, the sole
exception being research on externalities in collective decision making
(Stokman et al. 2001; Van Assen et al. 2003). The current article is a
start at filling this large gap in the field of exchange research.
The field of network exchange research is rife with theories (see
Willer and Emanualson 2005 for an overview). However, generalization
of these theories to exchange with externalities is by no means straight-
forward, and presents a challenge to exchange theorists. Dijkstra (2005)
modified and thereby generalized core theory such that it can be applied
to exchanges both with and without externalities. Hypotheses derived
from (generalized) core theory predicted varying degrees of competition
between actors A and C in the different interdependence situations.
Competition was predicted to be fiercest in the resource dilemma, fol-
lowed by the market. No competition was predicted in the household
and the public good problem. In the latter two conditions generalized
core theory predicted identical exchange ratios, which were predicted to
be more favorable to A and C than in the market. The least favorable
exchange ratios for A and C were predicted in the resource dilemma.
These effects were indeed found in the data and all hypotheses were cor-
roborated, indicating that externalities do matter in exchange situations
and have predictable effects on exchange ratios. Some issues concern-
ing the results deserve further attention.
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Contrary to the other conditions, we didn’t find an effect of Round in
the market. This might come as a surprise, since previous research on
market-like exchange networks (networks with one seller and multiple
buyers) demonstrated that the demand of the buyers decreases in Round
(e.g., Skvoretz and Zhang 1997). The absence of an effect of Round is
probably due to the fact that the three practice rounds subjects played
before the actual experiment were played in the market condition. These
practice rounds might thus have provided an anchor for the actual exper-
iment. In the market experiment the conditions didn’t change with
respect to this anchor situation, leading to outcomes that were stable
across rounds. In the other situations, conditions did change with respect
to the anchor situation, leading to gradually changing exchange ratios
over time. This possible anchoring effect does not confound our results.
On the contrary, despite the possible anchor we did observe the pre-
dicted differences between the conditions after ten rounds.
With respect to the resource dilemma, we observed a remarkable dif-
ference between groups of subjects. In two of the four groups the A and
C subjects on average didn’t lose in their exchanges with B, whereas
A and C subjects in the other two groups did. Loss aversion cannot
explain this result, since completing an exchange with B that implies a
loss to A (C) prevents an even larger loss for the exchanging actor. An
explanation could be based on perceptions of fairness. Subjects in the
two groups might consider it fair that a central player such as B harvests
the entire surplus of exchange due to her network position, but consider
it unfair if more than the exchange surplus is appropriated by B. In any
case the results reveal that not only the structure of the resource
dilemma determines the results, but also the characteristics of the actors
involved in the dilemma. We expect that the possible effect of actor
characteristics is overruled by the effect of structure, when the resource
dilemma involves more than two peripheral actors like A and C; coop-
eration (not exchanging with B or transferring only a small amount of
resources to B) among actors is only possible if all of them are prepared
to cooperate.
Although we formulated no hypotheses concerning the proportions of
completed exchanges in the different conditions, we did find some inter-
esting results. The proportions observed seem to mirror the amount of
competition between subjects A and C. Proportions were highest in the
resource dilemma and lowest in the public good problem. The proportion
of completed exchanges in the household was in between these two
extremes. This is an indication that externalities also influence the rate of
agreement in exchange networks: when externalities enhance competition,
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they seem to increase actors’ willingness to reach agreement, whereas
externalities that attenuate competition have the opposite effect.
In this article we focused on one particular outcome of exchange in
networks, namely the exchange ratio. Another important outcome of
exchange networks not investigated in the present article is the exchange
pattern, i.e., the pattern of who exchanges with whom. In a future article
experiments will be reported that investigate the effects of externalities
on both the exchange ratio and partner selection in exchange networks.
Like the hypotheses concerning the exchange ratio, the hypotheses con-
cerning partner selection will be derived from generalized core theory.
The results predicted for and observed in the laboratory experiments
reported in the present article have implications for real-life exchanges.
Whenever externalities exist, it is insufficient to know only actors’
resource endowments and utilities, together with the network structure,
to make sensible predictions concerning the outcomes of the exchange
process. One needs to know the size and sign of the externalities as well,
as they may crucially influence the outcomes. Thus, in for instance col-
lective decision-making situations such as parliaments and labor-
management negotiations, the exchanges of two parties may well have
profound effects for other parties involved in the decision process. As
this article indicates, the structure of these externalities might dramati-
cally alter the outcome with respect to a situation without externalities.
An important question concerns the ecological validity of our con-
clusions regarding actor behavior in the four interdependence situations.
First of all, we only considered very simple situations involving only
three actors. Secondly, we only considered behavior in the four situa-
tions under the one-exchange rule. Discarding the one-exchange rule in
the Line3 network does not change the predictions of behavior in the
household and the public good interdependence situations, but it elimi-
nates the advantage of the B actor in the market and changes the
resource dilemma into a prisoner’s dilemma game.
Discarding the one-exchange rule allows the study of other dilemmas.
For example, it transforms the resource dilemma into a prisoner’s
dilemma; the dominant strategy of both A and C is to exchange with B,
but if both A and C exchange with B, both A and C end up with a neg-
ative payoff. The Pareto efficient outcome results when both A and C do
not exchange with B. This example shows that also prisoner’s dilemmas
can be conceived of as exchanges with externalities. A future article will
investigate the difference in outcomes between ‘regular’ prisoner’s
dilemmas and two experiments we conducted in which prisoner’s dilem-
mas were embedded in exchange networks.
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To conclude, we have studied only one of many instances of each of
four interdependence situations. However, our study shows that all these
situations can be fruitfully studied in the same general framework of
exchange networks with externalities, and that generalized core theory
could provide accurate relative predictions of actor behavior in the
instances examined.
NOTES
1. If one defines externalities such that exclusion and interdependence are included in
the definition, the definition becomes meaningless because all possible effects of an
exchange are then by definition externality effects. Our definition allows one to dis-
tinguish the effects of exclusion and competition and the direct effects of exchange,
i.e., the mere addition or subtraction of payoff as a result of the exchange.
2. The instruction and test can be obtained from the first author.
3. For example, if one wants to estimate and test the multilevel model with only variable
Round as predictor, then the following equation is estimated: Yij = γ00 + γ10Round + U0j +
eij. The random variables U0j and eij are assumed to be normally distributed with mean
zero. Their variances are parameters and are estimated in the multilevel model. U0j is the
group-dependent deviation, eij is the observation-dependent deviation of the prediction.
The equation can be expanded by including other predictors, like Game and
Game*Round.
4. The parameter estimates obtained by running an analysis separately on two games are
identical to those obtained when analyzing the four games altogether (presented in Table
3). However, the standard errors of these estimates differ. Consequently, to test for dif-
ferences between the games an analysis is required that only compares the two games.
5. In fact, this would be the predicted outcome of classic theories of bilateral monopoly
such as the Nash bargaining solution (Nash 1950) and the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975).
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